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Volunteer labor in traditional societies is a key part of village life. There is no paid local public labor force to collect litter and sweep the roads, maintain village lands and pathways, and build and repair coastal barriers and irrigation and aquaculture channels.
There is also no public labor force to repair or renovate village-provided public buildings such as mosques and village and fishermen's halls. Buildings like schools and health care facilities are government provided. At times, there are construction monies for villageprovided buildings such as halls or mosques from outside sources. However, repairs, maintenance, and renovation are a different matter. In Indonesia, such local public labor activities are done through volunteer labor, where village males assemble several times a month, in a response to a call by the village head for a volunteer day. While volunteer days may be viewed as informal voluntary taxation (Olken and Siyokal 2011) What is the effect of democratization on volunteerism? A priori, given work by Dalbo, Foster, and Putterman (2010) or Bardhan (2000) , we thought democratization might increase volunteerism. 2 In experimental work, Dal Bo, Foster, and Putterman (2010) find that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when the policy is chosen democratically, as opposed to imposed exogenously. We find democratization is associated with reduced volunteerism. Relative to Dalbo et al., we 4 note that pre-democratic volunteerism in our villages was not exogenously imposed; it occurred in a traditional village context.
Prior to election reforms in early 2006, in most villages, village heads were chosen by a variety of informal mechanisms, with elites effectively selecting village heads. As such, volunteer days involved public labor choices made by heads selected by elites. Democratization introduced formal elections, whereby almost all former village heads are replaced. Villages having elections by the two time periods for which we have data (late 2007 and 2009 ) have about 35% lower volunteerism than villages yet to have elections and effects persist. We will argue that the effect is causal. While there may be competing explanations for the effect, we will argue that volunteerism declines because a democratically elected leader, relative to an elite leader, has preferences for fewer projects that involve volunteer labor. Thus the effect follows from a regime change. The outcome is consistent with the work of Martinez-Bravo, Padró-i-Miquel, Qian, and Yaoo (2011) , which finds that, in China after local election reforms, locally elected leaders are more responsive to the wants of villagers than leaders imposed from above.
Is the association of differentially timed elections with lower volunteerism a causal effect of elections on volunteerism? 3 We don't have the context to nail an experimental causal effect and it is not clear under what circumstances such a context would arise. What we have is evidence that is suggestive of a causal relationship. In general, the magnitude of the relationship is the same with no villa ge level controls versus extensive controls that affect volunteerism, suggesting the elections' effects may 3. Under the Aceh autonomy laws passed after settlement of the civil conflict, villages receive a small grant (about $11,000 USA) from the provincial government, which in principle they cou ld spend on paid labor. However this goes to villages whether they have had elections or not, so the differential effect of the introduction of elections is not related to government spending crowding ou t private giving (Andreoni 1993) . be orthogonal to other factors. But the key is to argue that, as related to volunteer days, the timing of elections is pseudo-randomized. Formal elections are spread over at least 5 years, driven in part by differential timing of when district and subdistrict governments push villages in their domain to have elections. This aspect is discussed in detail in section 3. The timing of village elections, beyond district fixed effects, is uncorrelated with observable village characteristics. Most critically, elections held in different years have the same effects on volunteerism, suggesting that unobservables affecting election timing do not influence election impacts on volunteerism. Finally, we also have placebo elections, which are informal "elections," typically dominated by village elites held soon after the tsunami to replace village leaders who died. Such elections have no effects on volunteerism.
In doing this analysis we can't and shouldn't completely divorce the paper from the unusual context of massive destruction and aid in post-tsunami Aceh. First, there are potentially direct effects of destruction on volunteerism. Public building that were destroyed were replaced by NGO's with brand new buildings, potentially reducing the need for volunteerism for maintenance, while surviving public buildings generate a need for damage repair and maintenance. Destruction required reconstruction of the coastal line and barriers, mostly by volunteer labor. Second, it may be that differential destruction, differential existing social capital stocks and their destruction, and the massive aid process could all affect volunteerism and could as well influence the timing of elections. At a minimum we want to show that controlling for these factors does not affect the democratization results.
6 However, the context provides an opportunity to relate to other literatures on volunteerism. When we develop our model of election impacts, we will discuss the general demand and supply factors affecting volunteerism. When we discuss the effects of controls we will talk about explicit hypotheses in the literature that our results relate to.
To give a taste of the issues here, we note that in the literature, volunteerism may be affected by village size and diversity (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003) . Volunteerism may be affected by the aid and destruction process, with aid directly altering the opportunity costs and benefits of volunteering (Svennson 2000 , Labonne and Chase 2008 , Knack and Rahman 2007 . Social capital and its destruction by the tsunami could affect volunteering by, say, altering the perceived social costs of not volunteering (Putnam 1995 , Sobel 2002 , Getler, Levine, and Miguel 2009 . 4 Later, in a section on controls, we will suggest specific hypotheses that our data may relate to.
We start by describing the unusual context. Then we present a model of volunteerism, discuss the estimating framework, and analyze results.
THE CONTEXT
We look at the extent of destruction from the tsunami, aid delivery, and aspects of democratization relevant to the investigation. To keep a sequence of events, we start with items related to our controls, before turning to democratization. away from the capital Banda Aceh and were inaccessible in 2005. The intent was to cover the universe of fishing villages as we moved some distance south and north-east of the capital Banda Aceh, as explained in the appendix. Our villages are in the five districts most affected by the tsunami and account for about 30% of all house aid in Aceh, with urban Banda Aceh accounting for much of the rest. The timing of the tsunami, fieldwork, and surveys are in appendix table A1. One set of surveys focuses on village level characteristics and outcomes. As noted in the appendix, they ask in detail about the public and private capital destruction and the aid process and then ask background questions on village demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table A2 in the appendix gives statistics on village characteristics we use in estimation. For these questionna ires, in the majority of cases, the official interviewee is the village head, who is also the respondent to the PODES, a tri-annual census of Indonesian village populations and facilities. But often multiple village officials were present and village heads were not shy about asking other prominent villagers to supply or confirm information. 5 5. In 2007, for example, 62% of the time the official respondent was the village head, 25% the secretary, and the rest at least both. But often the mullah or head of the local fisherman's association would drop by and participate in the interview. Surveyors generally did not record this , as these are not village officials per se.
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The tsunami devastated coastal cities and villages. under 50% of the population survived; in the expanded set used in the paper the survival rate is 75%. The destruction of physical capital in the overall sample was almost universal, given both the earthquake that created the tsunami and the wave following 20-30 minutes later. Survival rates of houses for the overall sample averaged 9.7% and of all public buildings 16%.
The immediacy and extent of aid is impressive. As we will note below, aid was private, most done directly by NGO's with some foreign government monies funneled through a temporary agency in Aceh set up by the national government. District and subdistrict governments did not play a role in organizing and delivering aid, although they are responsible for organizing village elections. In terms of aid, in our villages, Elections appear not to be kind to old leaders, although we don't know the extent to which such leaders stood for election (but then that would be endogenous). At the end of 2009, under 15.5% of old village heads remained in office and under 22.7% of those (i.e., five) were in office after an election (table 2). We believe that this means that formal elections shift power from a narrow set of village elites to the more general population, 
total volunteer labor devoted to a project and thus gives the endogenous scale of any project.
For the volunteer process, to simplify, we assume a volunteer provides a fixed amount of effort at a cost b . We start by assuming that b is the same for all villagers.
Heterogeneity in b will help explain, in an obvious way, individual participation differences and could arise from differences in personal or psychic costs of participation and the like. Of course, heterogeneity in b makes the full village solution more difficult.
But if, say, b increases with x but at a slower rate, our comparisons of equilibria under the two regimes will not be qualitatively affected. 
This defines an implicit function
Note also that /0 s db dC  . One might impose that any project has a minimum required
If this is imposed, s cannot be exceeded if a project is to be viable. The decision maker in each regime can only muster volunteer labor if he also volunteers (after all he must lead the volunteer group). He only does that if the total benefits to him of having the project equal or exceed his cost of volunteering, or
This defines a second implicit function defining the lowest valuation project announced by the village head:
Note for this also that / 0, / 0 ss dC db dC dx  .
7. Either volunteer labor is the only election decision, or preferences on other election dimensions are ordered in the same fashion on the unit interval.
14 In figure 1 we graph an example of the general forces at work. The negatively sloped equation (1b) Thus total projects and total volunteerism are higher in the elite regime. Knack and Rahman 2007) , that could reduce the efficiency ( ) with which volunteer labor is used. On the supply side, there should be differences in typical costs on volunteering in a village, b , apart from within village differences. Higher stocks of social capital could reduce perceived costs of volunteering or working with others in the village towards common goals. Akin to Svennson (2000) and Labonne and Chase (2008) , more aid delivered in a village, although coming from outside aid agencies, could increase market opportunities in the local transport and food service sector, raising costs of volunteering, or divert villagers' energies in negotiating over the division of aid. Higher costs, b , for the village cause both curves in figure 1 to shift up, meaning that the minimum j C is increased (fewer projects under either regime).
While the impact on j s is ambiguous, total volunteerism declines-fewer projects with less volunteerism for each.
THE DETERMINANTS OF VOLUNTEERISM ACROSS VILLAGES
The key outcome in this study is volunteer days called in the last month, where the village head calls volunteer days up to twice a week during the month. In the village level surveys in 2007 and 2009, we ask whether volunteer days were called in the last month and, if so, how many. In 2007, we also asked how many days typically were called pretsunami in a month. 
(b) Basic results on elections
In this section, we start by treating the timing of elections as "exogenous," being driven by differential subdistrict priorities and capacities, rather than village level unobservables affecting volunteerism. As such, election effects are regime-switch effects. Then we turn to evidence that supports this assumption. In the estimation, as noted, we control for a variety of village characteristics relating to size, diversity, survival and destruction from the tsunami, and village social capital, allowing for 2009 differential effects of each relative to 2007. We discuss the results on these characteristics in Section 3d.
The key variable we focus on in this section is whether the village has had an election to date. This information is taken from the 2009 interviews, where we were careful in questioning to distinguish officially sanctioned elections from informal ones, typically held in the first two years after the tsunami, a distinction we will utilize below. In columns 4-7 we do some robustness checks on the basic specification. In column 4, we add in a control for typical monthly pre-tsunami volunteer days as recollected by the villagers present at the interview. Obviously this measure has issues to do with both recollection inaccuracy and bias. But it is a control for pre-tsunami village tendencies, which could also be correlated with timing of elections, although, as we will see below, timing is uncorrelated with pre-tsunami volunteer days. The measure of pretsunami volunteer days has little impact on the election-to-date coefficient and itself is insignificant. Column 5 adds in measures of the need for and extent of aid: the number of houses destroyed by the tsunami and the count of RAN projects. Coefficients on these (not shown) are completely insignificant and inclusion of these variables has no impact of the election-to-date coefficient. We also experimented with dropping the few villages in which the month of surveying was an election month; that left results from column 3 unchanged (slightly strengthened). Column 6 estimates the specification in column 3 by
Tobit with censoring at 0 volunteer days and the dependent variable being the log of volunteer days for those with days, which gives an election-to-date elasticity comparable to column 3. Tobit gives stronger effects. Column 7 estimates by OLS where the dependent variable is the count of volunteer days. There, an election-to-date lowers the number of volunteer days in 2007 by 0.462 from a mean of 1.51 (table A2) We now turn to the key analysis of identification, beyond examining election timing in and of itself. Threats to causality include the idea that the type of village head changes because of the aid process (more educated), and effects reflect that, rather than a shift in regime per se. Or it could be that villages that had an election versus those that did not (by the end of 2009) are different and those differences drive the volunteerism differences. We now explore these issues looking at village head education, election timing and differential effects for elections at different times, placebo elections and village fixed effects. The experiments we carry out are reported in tables 5 and 6. We report one at a time.
Village Head Education
We start with the issue that elections generally bring in better-educated village heads, who might desire or only be able to muster fewer volunteer days. As a management style, they might want to produce public goods with fewer volunteer inputs per se. In table 5, a control in column 1 for whether the village head has a high school education or not has a zero effect in both years on volunteerism and no impact on the election magnitude compared to the base case in column 1. This suggests both that volunteerism is not different in villages with more educated heads and that village head education is not driving election results.
Election Timing
The In the hazard and the Probit estimations, in table 6, in columns (1) and (3), only one of the 18 coefficients (an arisan group pre-tsunami in the Probit) for village characteristics significantly affects election timing. We will discuss arisan groups in section 3d. Columns 2 and 4 show that additionally there is no partial correlation with pre-tsunami volunteer days. This is a pretty compelling case that village observables do not affect election timing. Table 2 also suggests reasonable balance in the data between villages that have an election before the end of 2009 versus not, and any imbalance seems to be offset by district fixed effects. These results indicate why we didn't pursue IV work, for example instrumenting for elections with death of the village head. Those deaths only resulted in early informal elections, and didn't affect the timing of formal elections. We struggled to find other predetermined conditions that had a significant influence and don't report the many experiments which bore no fruit, including distance to Banda Aceh, village located on the seashore or not, female versus male survival rate, and whether the dominant occupation is fishing or farming. responses raise issues such as "been head too long" implies disgruntlement, which could affect volunteerism.
It should be clear we are not claiming election timing is exogenous to all village conditions. We instead argue that unobservables affecting volunteerism don't affect timing of elections, using three pieces of evidence. First, we show the election effect is the same regardless of election timing. While that does not prove the final set of villages (those with elections yet to come after 2009) are different than all other villages, it is strong evidence for regime switch effects. Whatever unobservables differentiate whether elections are held in the years from 2006 through 2009, they have no effect on election coefficients. Second, and related, we show that "placebo elections" have no effect. Third, we will introduce village fixed effects to control for all village conditions, but to do so we must take seriously the information on pre-tsunami volunteerism. 
Village Fixed Effects
Finally we turn to village fixed effects in estimator has an election effect of -0.27, a still strong effect, although smaller than those we found in different specifications in the same row.
(d) Controls in the basic specification
The tables contain numerous controls that relate to destruction, aid, and social capital.
Here we examine effects conditional on all other controls. We focus the discussion on our preferred specification, column 3 of table 4. Table 7 We then turn to a set of variables that could be interpreted as measures of social capital, although they may have other channels of influence. Greater social capital should 11. Occupations with their average shares are: fishing (28%), aquaculture (5%), agriculture (29%), t rade (8%), transport (4%), construction (6%), public service (9%), other (6%), and unemployed (6%). 27 reduce the psychic costs of volunteering (Sobel 2002, Getler, Bellows, and Miguel, 2009 ). Foremost in our data is the pre-tsunami existence or not of a rotating saving and credit association (RoSCA), called arisan group. Such groups, usually composed of women who meet regularly, with each member contributing a fixed sum to a pot and then taking the pot on a rotating schedule. Arisan groups are a volunteer association outside the mosque and governance structure. While the original work was on RoSCA's role in alleviating credit market imperfections (Besley, Coate, and Loury 1994) , empirical work suggests a strong social component, with participation rising with wealth and complementing rather than substituting for credit institutions, at least in Indonesia (Varadharajan 2004) . We view the existence of an arisan group as an indicator of a higher level of social capital and spirit of mutual assistance pre-tsunami. In 2005, male villagers repeatedly identified women as the social "glue" which facilitated village unity and purpose. 68% of our villages report the existence of an arisan group pre-tsunami. 12 Clearly the treatment effect here is not to say, if one randomly formed an arisan group pre-tsunami, that would give the effect we see. It is the pre-tsunami conditions in the village, which led to the formation of an arisan group, that we are trying to representthe village social capital.
The control has a positive effect in 2007, as the literature suggests, with the pretsunami existence of an arisan group pre-tsunami increasing volunteer days by 30%. A surprise is that by 2009 in table 7, the arisan group effect is close to zero. This goes against the spirit of persistence of social capital effects found in the growth literature 12. We asked about other social capital indicators also dominated by women such as Quran recitation groups and PKK groups, but almost all villages report such activities both pre-and post tsunami, so there is effectively no village level variation. In addition, Quran recitation is a religious activity sponsored by the mosque, and PKK groups are sponsored by the national government offering "guidance for family and welfare" and have political-social overtones, not mutual assistance ones.
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(e.g., Guiso Sapienza and Zingales 2008 and Tabelini 2008) . But our context is unusual.
Survivors in villages were disproportionately prime adult males, so there was widespread new family formation, investment in family life, and a restructuring of village female networks (Alesini and Giuliano 2009 and Ermisch and Gurr 2008) . Villages transformed physically and socially, potentially weakening the value of pre-tsunami social capital.
There are additional controls, which could be interpreted as relating to social capital. They all have to do with destruction and would then be interpreted as measuring greater or less destruction of social capital. That idea is in contrast to the notion that destruction could also be a rallying point for villagers, so that more trauma leads to more volunteerism (Bellows and Miguel 2009 and Zylberberg 2010) Then there are controls relating to survival and destruction of public buildings that are generally maintained by the village: great and regular mosques, village halls, fishermen's halls, and Islamic schools. Survival, relative to obtaining a brand new building through aid, could create a demand for public labor. In table 7, we see no effects; nor, less surprisingly, does the destruction rate of housing have effects.
In table 4 column 5, as noted above, we experimented with adding a measure of the extent of aid projects in the village. For the latter, most aid in our villages is complete by late 2007, so we were asking mostly whether predetermined aid activity affects volunteerism, not whether the arrival of aid today has a contemporaneous effect on volunteer days. Our aid measure is the total number of aid projects in the village. The literature suggests that more projects would create higher opportunity costs of volunteering and greater incentives to spend time lobbying for aid (Svennson 2000 and Labonne and Chase 2008) . Knack and Rahman (2007) argue that having more donors erodes local bureaucratic quality and capacity, which could reduce villagers' incentives to volunteer. Here we suggest that the village head may be distracted, and volunteer days may not be well planned or may be put off. 13 Regardless, there are no effects: coefficients 13. A key issue in interpreting aid effects concerns whether villages with unobserved tendencies to volunteer days attract differential aid. Henderson and Lee (2014) show that th e level of house aid seems uncorrelated with any observed measures of leadership survival, social capital, elections, or the overall RAN count of aid projects in a village. House aid, at least, seems driven by need and supply conditions (like access of NGO's to the village and extent of destruction). 
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Geographic Coverage
Overall, in terms of village coverage, we cover all villages in three contiguous districts (Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Besar) going south and north-east of the capital Banda Aceh, as well as off-shore islands of these districts. We also covered fishing villages in two other districts, up to a defined geographic limit moving east from Banda Aceh into Pidie (the last subdistrict surveyed is Meurah Dua) and moving south into Aceh Barat (the last subdistrict surveyed is Meuruebo). Figure A1 shows a map of the survey area, with a blow-up (right side in figure) of the Banda Aceh area (upper-left part of coastal area). The map shows household survival rates by village (yellow being the worst). Unfortunately, the map is based on the government rendering, post-tsunami, of village boundaries. In that dimension the map is grossly inaccurate. We took GPS readings of the center (the mosque) of the living area of each village. In only 6% of the cases is that GPS reading within the village boundaries. In 15% of the cases, it is over 10 kilometers away. Coastal villages are drawn as non-coastal and vice-versa which explains why, in parts of the map, a yellow (low survival) village may be shown next to a supposed coastal village, which is dark (high survival).
FIGURE A1 ABOUT HERE
Nevertheless the map pictures the general survey area.
The Survey Area
Sources of Population and Building Stock Numbers
To cover our villages consistently, for pre-and post-tsunami populations of villages, we use government counts. 
